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Different approaches to the social contract theory in Law and Politics.
Šimek, David ; Havel, Tomáš (advisor) ; Ondřejková, Jana (referee)
Different approaches to the social contract theory in law and politics Abstract This thesis aims to analyze individual concepts of social contract theory in works of various contractalist authors throughout history, including the 20th century. Using the method of analysis and especially diachronic comparison it tries to refute the belief that the social contract theory is only a phenomenon of the Enlightenment period of the 17th and 18th centuries, and presents the main, but also lesser known, contractalist ideas from both ancient and recent history. The thesis is, besides the introduction and conclusion, divided into five chapters and eight subchapters, some of which are also further subdivided. It follows a similar structure troughout its length, with the exception of the first (which aims to generalize the concept of social contract theory) and the fourth chapter. The second chapter is a chronologically arranged historical overview, which begins with the authors of ancient philosophy and through the Middle Ages then culminates in the early Renaissance. This is a chapter dealing with the genesis of contractualism, especially its origins in individualism, voluntarism or naturalism, as well as the concept of individual free will and the medieval phenomenon of the struggle between faith and reason, the...
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Liberalism and its justification in contemporary political philosophy
Cíbik, Matej ; Jirsa, Jakub (advisor) ; Chotaš, Jiří (referee) ; Moural, Josef (referee)
This thesis attempts to answer one basic question: what we can philosophically say to justify liberalism as a mode of political existence of society. It is divided into three parts. In the first one, I critically survey two popular answers to this question, employing the concepts of self- ownership and value pluralism respectively. I argue that both of them are inadequate and unsatisfactory, mostly because they operate with a conception of person that is too thin for the justificatory task. In the second part, I develop an interpretation of John Rawls and the conception of person he uses. I argue that this conception is crucial with regards to his answer to my question, yet that he provides only a limited and in the final analysis unpersuasive justification for it. The third part tries to remedy the deficiencies of Rawlsian liberalism by providing a better argumentative support for his conception of person and developing from it two arguments aiming to justify liberalism as a mode of political existence of society Key words Liberalism - John Rawls - Pluralism - Conception of person
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